Abstract-We present protocols for creating pairwise secrets between nodes in a wireless network, so that these secrets are secure from an eavesdropper, Eve, with unbounded computational and memory capabilities, but with limited network presence. We first present a basic secret-agreement protocol for single-hop networks, where secrets are constructed using traffic exchanged between the nodes, and we show that under standard theoretical assumptions, our protocol is information-theoretically secure. Second, we propose a secret-agreement protocol for arbitrary, multi-hop networks that build on the basic protocol but also comprises design features for leveraging additional sources, that multi-hop offers, for secrecy. Finally, we evaluate our protocols, and we provide experimental evidence that it is feasible to create thousands of secret bits per second, in realistic wireless setups, the security of which is independent of Eve's computational capabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
W E CONSIDER the problem where a group of n wireless nodes that form an ad-hoc wireless network, want to create n 2 pairwise secrets, such that a passive eavesdropper Eve, who is located in an unknown position in the network, learns very little about them. Current cryptographic secretagreement algorithms are designed around computational hardness assumptions: security breach cannot be achieved in useful time, since Eve does not posses sufficient computational power. We are interested instead in strong informationtheoretical or unconditional security, where security does not depend on computational limitations of Eve, but rather on the fact that Eve does not posses enough information to breach security. We are asking, whether it is possible to offer strong security, as the number of nodes n and number of pairwise keys increases, and over arbitrary wireless topologies.
In recent years, there has been significant interest on building information theoretical security out of wireless channel properties, but the work has been limited to very specific topologies and scenaria. The majority of the work considers pairwise key generation over a single channel with a single source and receiver [1] , [2] (see also [3] and references therein); the few works that have looked at multiple receivers still only consider a single source and receivers within the same broadcast domain [4] , [5] . Works that look at larger networks typically do not provide strong, but weak information security guarantees [6] - [8] , and mostly focus on single message distribution, as opposed to creating n 2 different secret keys (see also Section VIII on related work). Moreover, in most of the proposed practical works, the secret key generation rates achieved are only a few tens of bits per second [9] - [11] . In contrast, we show in this paper that can we leverage both channel and network properties, to create pairwise keys at rates that are of the order of Kb per second, for arbitrary n and wireless network topologies.
Our main contributions in the paper are as follows: First, we present a basic secret-agreement protocol, which enables n nodes connected to the same broadcast domain to create pairwise secrets that Eve knows very little about. Our protocol leverages the broadcast nature of the wireless to create pairwise secrets between all pair of nodes simultaneously, has polynomial time complexity and is readily implementable in simple wireless devices. We analyze our protocol in two ways: (i) Under standard information-theory assumptions (independent erasure channels between nodes and known erasure probabilities), we formally show that: (1) Our basic protocol is information-theoretically secure, i.e., it leaks no information to Eve about the secrets. ( 2) It achieves a secretgeneration rate that is optimal for n = 2 nodes and scales well with the number of nodes n. (ii) Through experimental evaluation, and estimation of the network parameters, as we discuss later.
Second, we consider secret-agreement over arbitrary, multihop networks. This is important, firstly, from a practical point of view: even when networks have a small number of nodes, as connectivity is impaired from distance, interference and other impediments (e.g., metal obstructions), it is challenging to consistently maintain a single-hop connected network. Secondly, multi-hop networks are also interesting from a technical point of view since they provide two new opportunities for secrecy that we could leverage: interference and multi-path propagation. Interference between concurrent transmissions (such as caused by the hidden terminal problem) may interfere with Eve's reception but not with the reception of other legitimate nodes; distinct packet propagation through multiple paths can ensure that Eve, located in an unknown but fixed position in our network, does not have access to all of them, and again misses packets that legitimate nodes receive.
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Finally, secret-agreement over arbitrary multi-hop networks can enable applications similar to the one we proposed in [12] . We propose a secret-agreement protocol for multi-hop networks, that builds on our basic protocol, but also comprises new design features that realize the benefits multi-hop offers for secrecy. This includes a customized packet dissemination protocol that balances two conflicting goals: spreading the packets as efficiently and as widely as possible among the legitimate nodes, while ensuring that a significant fraction of packets will not be overheard by Eve, who could be located in any place within the network. Our protocol is completely decentralized, does not differentiate between nodes and is readily implementable in simple wireless devices.
Third, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our protocols and we provide evidence that it is feasible in practice to create pairwise secrets at rates of thousands of bits per second in realistic setups. In the experimental setup, we assume no knowledge of channel parameters, and no knowledge of Eve's location or collected information -we estimate the quantities we need online. For the single-hop case, we use a small wireless testbed and for the multi-hop case we simulate different network configurations, consisting of up to 500 nodes and located up to 5-hops apart. We show that we can achieve secret generation rates in the magnitude of Kbps, independently from the adversary's computational capabilities.
In summary, our contributions in this paper are: 1) We design practical secret-agreement protocols for simultaneously generating n 2 secrets in: a) single-hop networks, by leveraging channel properties, b) arbitrary multi-hop networks, by leveraging both channel and network properties. 2) We evaluate the performance of our protocols through experimentation in realistic wireless environments. We note that the secret-agreement protocol for single-hop networks and a subset of the single-hop experimental results have been initially presented in our conference paper [13] . In particular, in [13] we demonstrated the minimum achievable secrecy rates in our testbed, whereas here we present more generalized measurements, that lead to new observations on secret key generation in a real wireless network. Extending the work to multi-hop networks is not a straightforward step, as new challenges, but also new opportunities, arise: we need to design a custom dissemination protocol, and we need to leverage additional sources of secrecy, in addition to channel noise. The multi-hop protocol and the associated experimental results are presented here for the first time.
The paper is organized as follows. After describing our setup ( §II), we describe our basic secret-agreement protocol, which enables n nodes connected in a single-hop network to create n 2 pairwise secrets under standard theoretical assumptions ( §III). Consecutively, we propose a secrete-key agreement protocol, that builds on top of the basic and enables n nodes connected in an arbitrary multi-hop network to create secrets ( §IV). Next, we state the properties of our protocols ( §V) and we adapt them to real networks, where theoretical network conditions do not hold ( §VI). Finally, we provide evaluation results on the performance our protocols ( §VII) and we conclude with a discussion ( §IX), after summarizing related work ( §VIII).
II. SETUP

A. System Model
We consider a set of n wireless nodes, T 1 , . . . , T n , that form an ad-hoc network. We will refer to these nodes as legitimate terminals, or simply terminals. Sometimes we will refer to terminals T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , and T 4 respectively as Alice, Bob, Calvin, and David.
We capture the network structure using two parameters:
• Number of hops describes the maximum distance (in hops) between any two terminals. More formally, in a k-hop network, for any two terminals T i /T j in the network there exists a k-hop path T i , r 1 , . . . , r k−1 , T j with k − 1 intermediate terminals such that every terminal is the neighbor of its preceding terminal along the path; moreover, there exists at least one pair of terminals for which there is no path with k − 1 hops.
• Network density expresses the expected number of terminals per unit network area; it affects the expected number of neighbors that a terminal has. We define the unit area as an 1-hop network, i.e., a network where all terminals are within the same broadcast domain. The terminals communicate with each other in three ways:
• When we say that terminal T i transmits a packet, we mean that it broadcasts the packet once, within its broadcast domain.
• When we say that terminal T i reliably broadcasts a packet, we mean that it ensures that all other terminals T j =i in the whole network receive it, e.g., through ACKs and re-transmissions.
• When we say that terminal T i unicasts a packet to terminal T j , we mean that the packet is intended only for terminal T j and it might get re-transmitted up to a certain number of times. Each terminal in the network has a unique id, that is revealed to all other terminals, and it can generate and transmit random packets. A random packet has a payload of L symbols over a finite field F q and thus has a size of L log q bits. The payload of a random packet is drawn from the uniform distribution. Each packet has a unique identifier, that consists of the generator's unique id together with a sequence number.
We assume that in our network packet erasures occur. A terminal experiences a packet erasure, or simply misses a packet (knows nothing about its content), if the packet gets transmitted in the network but cannot get received by the terminal's radio receiver. Packet erasures may occur in our network due to different effects (and/or combinations of these) that inherently arise in wireless networks: channel noise and fading (low reception SNR), collisions because of concurrent transmissions, a packet was transmitted outside a terminal's reception region etc. Independently of the causing effect(s), whenever a terminal's radio receiver was not able to lock on a packet's transmitted physical signal, we account this event as a packet erasure.
Our goal is to design protocols, that exploit packet erasures, in order to enable each pair of terminals in the network, T i /T j , to create a secret S i j , that is secure from an adversary as we model in the following sub-Section.
B. Adversary Model
We assume that in our network there exists a passive 1 adversary Eve, a non-legitimate node located at an unknown position, who eavesdrops every transmission in her reception region. Eve does not make any transmission herself, but uses the eavesdropped information at her disposal to compromise the security of the secrets created by the legitimate terminals.
We assume that Eve has access to the same physical layer (radio technology, number of antennas etc.) as the legitimate terminals -experiencing, therefore, packet erasures as they do. However, we also assume that Eve has infinite memory as well as unbounded computational capabilities at her disposal; this would follow the model of an adversary that does not want to reveal her presence by using specialized equipment, yet has offline access to unbounded resources to breach security. Moreover, we assume that Eve has perfect knowledge of the protocols used, of the network topology and of the terminals' identities. To be conservative, we also assume that Eve receives correctly all reliably broadcasted and unicasted (as defined in Section II-A) packets. Eve, using her knowledge, can optimally position herself inside the network, and keep her position secret. However, she has limited network presence; in the following we assume that she is situated in a single position, yet this assumption can be relaxed in the case where Eve is in multiple positions, as discussed in [14] .
Apart from the existence of Eve, we additionally assume that every legitimate terminal T i in the network may act as "honest but curious" towards the other terminals: T i runs the secret-agreement protocols honestly but may as well try to eavesdrop on other terminals' communications. In other words, we aim that a secret S i j generated between a pair of terminals T i /T j , is secure by both Eve and every other terminal T l =i, j .
C. Theoretical Network Conditions
We define the theoretical network conditions as follows: 1) When terminal T i transmits a packet, terminal T j (Eve):
-misses the entire packet, with probability δ i j (δ i E ) -receives the entire packet correctly, otherwise.
2) The T i -T j channel is independent from any T i -T l = j channel 2 and the T i -Eve channel, for all i, j, l.
3) The erasure probability δ i E of the T i -Eve channel is known, for all i .
D. Quality Metrics
We use the following metrics to evaluate the performance of our secret-agreement protocols:
• Efficiency captures the cost of the protocol, i.e., the amount of traffic it produces in order to generate pairwise secrets of a given size. The efficiency achieved by two terminals T i and T j that create a secret S i j , of length |S i j | bits, is defined as:
The denominator is the total number of bits transmitted by the protocol until S i j is created. In the case of multi-hop setups, this number includes re-transmissions of random packets from terminals other than the generator terminals.
• Secrecy rate measures how many secret bits per second are created between a pair of terminals; the secrecy rate is a function of the efficiency and the transmission rate.
• Reliability captures the quality of the created secrets, i.e., the extent to which they are unknown to Eve. The reliability of a secret S is defined as:
where X E is the information obtained by Eve via eavesdropping on the terminals' communications, H (S) is Eve's entropy (her uncertainty about S before she eavesdrops), and H (S|X E ) is Eve's conditional entropy (her uncertainty about S after she eavesdrops). R S = 1 implies information-theoretical secrecy: I (S; X E ) = 0; in other words, Eve does not learn anything about S by observing the protocol and the produced traffic. R S < 1 means that Eve can correctly guess the value of one bit of generated secret with probability higher than 0.5, e.g., R S = 0.8 means that this probability is 2 −0.8 = 0.57. If the terminals had knowledge of the exact information observed by Eve via eavesdropping, they would always be able to construct the longest possible secrets of reliability 1 (information-theoretically secure secrets). In practice, the terminals do not have access to this knowledge; the best they could do is to compute an estimateX E of X E . Under welldefined network models this estimation can become arbitrarily good, enabling the terminals to create secrets, using our protocols, of reliability 1 (we show this for the case of the erasure channel model in Section V and Appendices A, B). In real-world wireless networks, where theoretical conditions do not hold, the terminals need to heuristically compute this estimation (we elaborate on this in Section VI). Needless to mention, in case they underestimateX E , the constructed secrets will have reliability less than 1.
In Section VII, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our secret-agreement protocols by measuring (i) the ideal efficiency/secrecy rate; this is the efficiency/rate achieved by an oracle-assisted protocol, that is, a protocol that works like ours, with the only difference that it does not estimate how much information Eve obtains through eavesdroppingthat knowledge is directly provided to the legitimate terminals by the oracle, (ii) the effective efficiency/secrecy rate that is achieved by our protocols, where secrets are constructed based on estimations of Eve's knowledge. The reliability is a metric that allows us to capture how close does our protocol behave to the oracle-assisted one. Ideally, we would like our protocols to achieve high efficiency/secrecy rate, along with reliability scores as close as possible to 1.
III. BASIC SECRET-AGREEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the core of our secret-agreement protocol, that enables terminals T i and T j , which are connected in the same broadcast domain, i.e., they form a single-hop network, to create a secret S i j . Assuming the theoretical network conditions (as defined in Section II-C), S i j is perfectly secret from any terminal T k =i, j and an adversary Eve (we show this in Section V-A). In Table I , we explain the meaning of commonly used symbols throughout this section.
A. Main Idea
Suppose Alice and Bob exchange three random packets, x 1 , x 2 and x 3 . Suppose Eve misses (knows nothing about the contents of) two of the packets shared by Alice and Bob, x 1 and x 2 . If an oracle told Alice and Bob that Eve misses two of their shared packets (but not which two), they could create a perfect shared secret (one that Eve knows nothing about), by using two linear combinations of their shared packets, e.g.,
3 (where + denotes addition over a finite field, e.g., bitwise XOR over the binary field).
Building on this idea, our protocol consists of two phases: In the initial phase, the terminals exchange traffic to ensure that each terminal pair shares some number of random packets (as Alice and Bob share x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 in the example above). This happens over n rounds, with a different terminal transmitting in each round. In the privacy amplification phase, each terminal pair creates a secret out of the information they shared in the initial phase. For this, they "compress" their shared information enough to ensure that any other terminal or Eve know nothing about the secret (as Alice and Bob "compress" x 1 , x 2 , and x 3 into x 1 + x 2 , x 2 + x 3 in the example above). To do this compression correctly, the terminals need to know how much of their traffic exchange was overheard by Eve (but not which particular bits).
A naive approach would be to have each terminal pair create their secret separately, which would not scale well with the number of terminals. Instead, our protocol creates the pairwise secrets simultaneously, by harnessing the broadcast nature of wireless networks. 
B. Algorithm
Each terminal T i maintains n − 1 queues Q i j , j = i . In the beginning, these are empty.
Initial Phase
In round r = 1 . . . n: 1) Terminal T r generates and transmits N random packets (we will call them x-packets). 2) Each terminal T i =r reliably broadcasts the identifiers of the x-packets it received. 3) Each terminal T i adds to queue Q i j the identifiers and contents of the x-packets it shares with terminal T j =i . At this point, Q i j contains all the packets shared by terminals T i and T j .
Privacy Amplification Phase
For i = 1 . . . n − 1: 1) Terminal T i constructs M i j linear combinations of the packets in the queue Q i j , for all j > i (we will call them y-packets). It determines the number of y-packets M i j and constructs the y-packets as described in Section III-E. 2) Terminal T i reliably broadcasts the coefficients it used to construct the y-packets. 3) Each terminal T j >i uses the broadcasted coefficients and the contents of its queue Q j i to reconstruct the M i j y-packets. At this point, terminals T i and T j >i share M i j y-packets. Their secret S i j is the concatenation of these y-packets.
C. An Example Agreement
Suppose we have n = 3 terminals, Alice, Bob, and Calvin, and a passive adversary, Eve. All the channels between terminals or any terminal and Eve have erasure probability δ = 0.5.
In the initial phase, the terminals create shared information by exchanging packets. In the first round, Alice transmits Table II shows the x-packets known to each node at the end of the initial phase. Table III (top row) shows the x-packets shared by each terminal pair at the end of the initial phase (e.g., Alice and Bob share a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 among others). To help visualize who knows which x-packets, from the xpackets shared by Alice/Bob, we mark those known to Eve 4 , those known to Calvin as "barred" (e.g.,ā 2 ), and those known to both Eve and Calvin as both canceled out and barred (e.g., ā 1 ). We do the same for the other terminal pairs.
In the privacy amplification phase, the terminals create pairwise secrets by compressing their shared information. Alice and Bob compress their 10 shared x-packets into M 12 = 4 shared y-packets (linear combinations of the shared x-packets). Similarly, Alice/Calvin and Bob/Calvin compress their 10 shared x-packets into 4 shared y-packets. Table III (bottom row) shows the y-packets shared by each terminal pair. Notice that Eve cannot reconstruct any of these y-packets; she misses at least one x-packet in every linear combination constructed by the terminal pairs (e.g., Eve misses packet a 4 , hence she cannot reconstruct the y-packet a 3 + a 4 , that Alice and Bob have constructed and serves as one of their pairwise secrets). For the same reason, Calvin cannot reconstruct the y-packets constructed by Alice and Bob for their pairwise secret (e.g., Calvin misses packet b 3 , he cannot, therefore, reconstruct the y-packet b 1 
Similarly, Alice (Bob) cannot reconstruct the y-packets constructed by Bob (Alice) and Calvin for their pairwise secret.
This was an example to give a sense of how things work. Our protocol does not really construct so simple linear combinations (e.g., 4 random linear combinations out of 10 x-packets), as they may leak information to Eve (Section III-E).
D. Key Points
The size of the secret between two terminals depends on (1) the amount of information shared by the two terminals and (2) how much of this information Eve and the other terminals have missed. In the above example, Alice and Bob share 10 x-packets. Of these, Eve misses 5, and Calvin misses 4. Hence, Alice and Bob can construct up to 5 y-packets (linear combinations of their shared x-packets) that are perfectly secret from Eve, and up to 4 y-packets that are perfectly secret from Calvin. Since we want the Alice/Bob secret to be unknown to both Eve and Calvin, Alice/Bob should create only 4 y-packets. Creating a shorter secret would be inefficient. Creating a longer secret would necessarily result in Eve or Calvin knowing something about the secret (though not necessarily the entire secret).
An important feature of the protocol is that terminals T i and T j create shared information during all the rounds of the initial phase, not only when one of them transmits.
In the above example, at the end of the initial phase, Alice and Bob share not only x-packets transmitted by one of them, but also x-packets transmitted by Calvin (c 1 , c 2 ). In the particular example, these packets turn out not to be useful in creating the Alice/Bob secret, because Calvin knows both of them (and we want the secret to be unknown to Calvin). However, when we have more than n = 3 terminals, leveraging x-packets transmitted by all terminals becomes key to the protocol's scalability with the number of terminals. For instance, imagine that there is a fourth terminal, David, which transmits x-packets d 1 
E. Secret Construction
Terminals T i and T j construct the following number of y-packets in the privacy amplification phase:
where:
-V E is the expected number of x-packets that are shared by terminals T i /T j and missed by Eve. -V l is the number of x-packets shared by terminals T i /T j and missed by terminal T l . We compute V E as n r=1 U r E , where U r E = δ r E · U r , and U r is the number of x-packets transmitted by terminal T r and received by both terminals T i /T j in round r of the initial phase. In short, we count, for each terminal and for Eve, how many of T i /T j 's shared x-packets this terminal/Eve has missed (or is expected to have missed, in Eve's case), and we set M i j to the smallest of these numbers.
It is straightforward to adapt this computation to the scenario where up to some number of terminals collude to learn S i j , but we do not consider this scenario here.
Terminals T i and T j construct the y-packets using simple constructions based on Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes [15] , as described in Lemma 5 in the Appendix. There is no novelty in these constructions (they rely on standard properties of MDS codes). One such property is that, if Eve has t packets, then each y-packet involves at least t +1 packets, which ensures that Eve cannot reconstruct it.
IV. SECRET-AGREEMENT FOR MULTI-HOP NETWORKS
In this section we describe a secret-agreement protocol for multi-hop networks, that builds on the basic protocol (Section III) and comprises new design features. In addition to channel noise and fading, multi-hop networks offer two more sources of packet erasures, that we aim to exploit for creating secrets: (1) interference from simultaneous transmissions, (2) existence of multiple paths between terminals. We design a protocol, consisting of a packet dissemination phase followed by a feedback phase, that essentially replaces the initial phase of the basic secret-agreement protocol. Before giving the protocol description, we illustrate its core design concepts.
A. Leveraging More Than Channel Noise
During the initial phase of the basic protocol, each terminal simply generates and transmits N x-packets during its round. For multi-hop networks, we need a more sophisticated dissemination protocol, that balances two goals: on one hand maximizing the number of random packets between every pair of terminals, and on the other hand, minimizing the number of packets that Eve overhears. For instance, having a terminal generate random packets and flooding the network with them does not work well, because Eve ends up overhearing most of these packets, and thus they cannot be exploited for secrecy. We need a protocol that efficiently "creates erasures"; a protocol that, first, exploits the intrinsic opportunities that wireless multi-hop networks offer to evoke packet erasures and, second, it does so in a way that ensures as much as possible uncorrelated packet receptions from legitimate terminals, without requiring unnecessarily many packet transmissions (that would yield a very low efficiency). We design our packet dissemination protocol leveraging the following:
1) Channel Noise and Fading: Ideally, we would like the broadcast transmissions to be subject to independent erasures across the receivers so that Eve does not receive exactly the same packets as her close neighbors. To achieve this, in the dissemination protocol we have every terminal in the network act as a source, to uncorrelate as much as possible the quality of reception from a terminal's location. Additionally, each terminal broadcasts a random packet it generates exactly once (without re-transmissions). Note that we can do this because we do not care which random packets terminals share, only how many.
2) Interference From Simultaneous Terminal Transmissions: Such interference for example occurs in the IEEE 802.11 protocol due to the hidden terminal problem. For us this is not a problem but a blessing in disguise: we would like our dissemination protocol to incur such interference, yet still not decrease dramatically the number of successful receptions. We allow, thus, the terminals to transmit simultaneously x-packets (in contrast to taking turns), at a rate that does not impose restrictively high collisions in a unit network area.
3) Multiple Paths: If there are two paths between Alice and Bob in the network, and Eve overhears only one of them, then if Alice sends packet x 1 on one path and x 2 on the other, Eve will receive only one of the two packets. In general, if Alice and Bob are connected with ν paths, while Eve can overhear at most z < ν of these (any z), it is optimal for the key generation rate if Alice sends to Bob a different packet through each path: Alice and Bob will share ν packets and Eve will learn only z of them [16] . To achieve this, we need a dissemination protocol that sends each packet through a single path.
B. Algorithm 1) Additional Parameters and Notation: Each terminal
T i can generate x-packets but also forward the x-packets generated by any other terminal in the network. In the unique identifier of each generated x-packet, a field ttl is appended describing the maximum number of times this packet can be transmitted in the network. Whenever a terminal transmits an x-packet (either generated locally or received by another terminal) is referred to as the sender of this packet. Each terminal transmits at rate 1 λ , where λ is the number of its neighbors.
2) Packet Dissemination Phase: Each terminal T i maintains n − 1 queues Q i j , j = i , that are empty in the beginning, and it records all overheard traffic. The packet dissemination is performed as follows: 1) Each terminal T i generates and transmits N x-packets; it waits a random time between transmissions so that on average it transmits at rate 1 λ . 2) Upon reception of an x-packet p, the receiver checks if this is first time it received this packet; if yes, the receiver unicasts an acknowledgment to the sender, otherwise it does not acknowledge.
3) The sender of a packet p selects a forwarder: Let R p denote the set of terminals that acknowledged p. The sender chooses a terminal uniformly at random from R p , and unicasts a control message to inform the node it is the selected forwarder. If R p = ∅, then p is not forwarded anymore. 4) The selected forwarder of a packet p (the next sender of p), reduces the ttl field by one and transmits it. Steps 2 to 4 are repeated till the ttl field of all the packets in the network expires. Note that when transmitting a packet p the sender sets a timer T p , which defines a time window for acknowledging. Once T p has expired, step 3 takes place.
3) Feedback Phase: 
C. Key Points
The ttl determines how far a packet will propagate; thus it enables to control the trade-off between creating a large number of common packets between nodes, while keeping Eve's chances of overhearing low. Each terminal acts as source, so that we generate uniform traffic across the network, and make packet receptions spatially uncorrelated. Terminals transmit at random intervals to incur collisions and at rate 1 λ so that, as the density of the network increases, we do not cause congestion. By selecting a single forwarder we avoid flooding and exponential replication of packets; instead, each packet follows a single random walk through the network, so that we exploit multi-path erasures. Note also that the dissemination of a packet may stop early, because R p may not contain receivers due to lost or late acknowledgments, or because the control message that selects a forwarder is not received. As our protocol does not aim to deliver specific messages but instead to create shared x-packets, such losses do not have a significant effect.
D. Communication Overhead of the Reliable Broadcast
In certain steps of the secret-agreement protocol, each terminal needs to reliably broadcast an amount of information to other terminals, notably at (1) step 2 of the feedback phase, (2) step 2 of the privacy amplification phase. The additional communication overhead imposed by these operations varies, depending on the way we choose to implement them.
For the feedback phase, we assume that we use an efficient all-to-all broadcast dissemination scheme; indeed, many such schemes have been explored in the literature [17] , [18] . In Section VII-B, we evaluate the secrecy rate achieved by our protocol taking into account only the overhead of the packet dissemination phase; we do not take, thus, into account the overhead of the feedback phase that would depend on the particular all-to-all scheme employed. To approximately estimate how much this overhead could reduce our secrecy generation rate, we next perform a back of the envelope calculation.
For the dissemination step there are T d n/λ×(N L log q × ttl) bits transmitted in total, 5 with λ here denoting the average number of neighbors. For the feedback step we have T f n[γ (n − 1) + 1] × n N bits, where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, denoting a forwarding factor for each terminal, that depends on the broadcast protocol used. Thus, our secrecy rate would be approximately reduced by a constant factor of 1 + μ, where μ is defined as follows:
Example: Assume a k-hop network with k = 3 and n = 90 in which we disseminate x-packets of size 1KB and ttl = 3, during the dissemination step. In addition, assume we use a network coding technique as described in [18] for the feedback step, for which γ = 2/λ yields an almost 100% packet delivery ratio. In that case, μ 0.67 meaning that the achieved rate should be divided by a factor of 1 + μ = 1.67. For the same network and for n = 135, the rate should be divided by a factor of 1 + 1.51 = 2.51.
In the privacy amplification phase, a terminal T i needs to communicate to terminal T j the coefficients it used for constructing the y-packets, i.e., their shared secret S i j . Depending on how the terminals intend to use this S i j , this operation could be carried out without adding any communication overhead at all. For instance, if T i uses S i j as an one-time-pad encryption key to send a confidential message to T j , these coefficients can be appended at the end of the encrypted message itself. Or, the terminals could just use the same deterministic algorithm, e.g., using as input the unique ids of the two terminals, to compute independently the same MDS matrix A (see Lemma 5 5 We do not account for re-transmissions, since we assume a MAC layer where re-transmissions are by default disabled in broadcast mode, as in IEEE 802.11.
in Appendix A); in that case no further communication is needed.
V. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
A. Single-Hop Networks
We state, in the following, certain properties of the basic protocol and also present an argument on why this particular protocol outperforms a more obvious alternative. We summarize the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 4 in Appendix A. We omit the proof of Lemma 2, which is straightforward.
Lemma 1: If the theoretical network conditions hold, there exists a sufficiently large N for which the basic protocol is information-theoretically secure against a passive adversary.
From the previous lemma, our protocol is secure; next we examine what efficiency it can achieve. Note that while for n = 2, we create a single key S with some efficiency E, for n ≥ 3, the efficiency is different for each secret S i j , and depends on the erasure probabilities δ ri , δ r j , and δ r E . In our notation, the efficiency simply corresponds to the ratio
To calculate it, we need M i j , to count how many packets a queue contains that Eve (or eavesdropping terminals) have not received. Over the theoretical network conditions, we can estimate M i j using expected values. Lemma 6 in the Appendix provides concentration results showing that our estimation error becomes zero exponentially fast in the number of packets N. Lemma 2 provides such an example calculation.
Lemma 2: If the theoretical network conditions hold, and we assume non-colluding eavesdroppers, then there exists a sufficiently large N for which the basic protocol achieves:
• n = 2 terminals,
This lemma verifies an intuitive fact: as the number of terminals (and transmission rounds in the initial phase) n increases, what dominates the size of each queue is the number of packets (1 − δ 2 ) 2 N jointly overhead by two terminals; the fraction of these (δ 1 or δ E ) that is unknown to our strongest eavesdropper equals the amount of secrecy we can create. In other words, the fact that we keep adding x-packets in each queue during all rounds is the key in the protocol's scalability.
Lemma 3: Under the conditions of Lemma 2, for n = 2 terminals, the basic protocol achieves maximum efficiency.
Indeed, the efficiency we achieve for n = 2 reaches Maurer's upper bound [2] .
The basic protocol scales well with the number of terminals because we try to leverage broadcasting as much as possible. If we were, instead, attempting pairwise secret establishment, the efficiency would quickly go to 0 with the number of terminals. To see this, consider the following, conceptually simpler alternative to the basic protocol: Consider a timedivision protocol, where we operate in time-slots, and at each time-slot we create the key S i j between a specific terminal pair, using the best possible protocol that achieves efficiency δ E (1 − δ) [2] . Since we have n 2 keys to create, and each key is created during only one time-slot, the overall efficiency is
per key. Unlike the efficiency of our protocol that converges to a constant value as n increases, E (alt) goes to zero.
Finally, the most demanding operations a terminal needs to perform is linear combining to create the y-packets. Thus:
Lemma 4: Each terminal that participates in the basic protocol executes an algorithm that is polynomial in N and n.
B. Multi-Hop Networks
In contrast to the single-hop network scenario, where the erasure channel model is well defined and allows us to do closed-form computations, the multi-hop wireless networks do not offer this opportunity. The existence of correlated events and non-independent conditions make the task of upperbounding Eve's reception capabilities very difficult. In fact, the probability of Eve (or any other terminal) receiving an x-packet depends on a multitude of effects, e.g., the various channel erasure probabilities, the probability of collision, the probability of the x-packet traveling though a specific path etc. This fact hinders us from calculating closed-form expressions about the efficiency achieved by our protocol, in the case of an arbitrary, multi-hop network.
Nevertheless, the property of information-theoretic security of our protocol holds also for the case of multi-hop networks, provided that an upper bound on the information that Eve can receive exists. Recall that (see Eq. 1) terminals T i /T j can construct up to M i j y-packets that are informationtheoretically secure (following Lemma 6 in Appendix A), and serve as their common secret S i j , provided they know (1) V l , i.e., the number of x-packets they share and were missed by terminal T l , and (2) V E , i.e., the number of x-packets they share and were missed by Eve. The value of V l can be precisely computed, given that each terminal announces the x-packets it has received during the feedback phase. A lower bound for V E can also be precisely computed, provided that an upper bound on Eve's reception capability exists and is known to terminals T i /T j .
VI. ADAPTING TO REAL NETWORKS
In this section, we adapt our secret-agreement protocols to the scenario where the theoretical network conditions (as defined in Section II-C) do not hold, and an upper bound of how much information Eve knows is not known (for the reasons explained in Section V-B).
The challenge with real networks is that we do not know the size of the pairwise secrets (the M i j from Section III-E) that we should create. In Section III-E, we were able to analytically compute M i j because we assumed that we knew enough about Eve's reception capabilities to compute the expected amount of information missed by Eve, but in a real wireless network this knowledge cannot be assumed with certainty. Instead, we try in practice to conservatively estimate the amount of information missed by Eve based on the amount of information missed by the terminals.
A. Basic Idea
In the case of single-hop networks and the basic protocol we think as follows: Alice and Bob assume that, during each round of the initial phase, Eve learns as much information as any of the other terminals about the x-packets shared by Alice/Bob. Hence, at the end of the initial phase, Eve is assumed to know at least as many of the Alice/Bob shared x-packets as the most knowledgeable terminal.
We chose this based on the following observations: Channel behavior varies significantly over time, to the point where we cannot estimate or even upper-bound how much information Eve collects during one experiment based on how much information she collected during past experiments. Channel behavior also varies over space, but less so: if, during an experiment, terminal T i receives many packets in common with neighbor T j , then T i most likely receives many packets in common with its other neighbors as well. It turns out that, by measuring how many packets each pair of neighboring terminals receive in common during one experiment, we can estimate quite accurately how many packets any terminal and Eve receive in common in the same experiment. This, of course, is an empirical estimation, thus we cannot guarantee its accuracy theoretically.
In the case of multi-hop networks our intuition is that the fraction of packets, out of the packets shared between a pair T i /T j , that was overheard by Eve, depends on how "far from each other" the pair of nodes are: nodes that are further apart may collect less common packets; yet among the packets they collect, Eve is likely to have overheard a smaller amount, since she would not intercept the transmissions in all paths that connect them. In addition, Eve will aim to position herself inside the network so as to maximize her probability of eavesdropping as many paths as possible, i.e., a position through which the majority of the available paths pass by.
B. Estimating Eve's Knowledge 1)
Single-Hop Networks: T i and T j estimate that, at the end of the initial phase, from their shared x-packets, Eve misses the following number:
where V r l is the number of new x-packets shared by terminals T i /T j and missed by terminal T l during round r of the initial phase.
In short, we assume that, in each round of the initial phase, Eve missed as few (of the x-packets newly shared by T i /T j in this round) as any other terminal.
2) Multi-Hop Networks: We form a set L of the nodes that have the largest number of neighbors. Let k i j be the distance between nodes T i /T j in hops and let P(k i j ) denote the set of all pairs of terminals in the network with the same distance k i j . Then: where V p l is the number of x-packets shared by pair p, with p ∈ P(k i j ), and missed by helper terminal T l , and avg P(k i j ) denotes average taken over the set P(k i j ).
In the above formula we select the nodes with most neighbors to be conservative (note that the larger the L the more conservative we are); we also calculate the average taken over all pairs with distance k i j , because a similar behavior is expected from pairs at the same distance.
C. Key Points
If we do not assume theoretical network conditions, in the case of singe-hop, or the existence of an upper-bound of how much Eve learns, in the case of multi-hop, we cannot offer formal guarantees about the reliability of our protocol, because we do not know exactly how much information Eve collects during the initial phase (resp. the packet dissemination phase): it is theoretically possible that Eve receives more x-packets in common with the terminals than we estimate, which means that she learns something about the pairwise secrets. The amount of information that leaks to Eve depends both on the particular wireless network and the number of terminals we use for our estimations: the more terminals we use, the more we learn about the quality of receptions throughout the network, and the better we can estimate the quality of Eve's receptions capabilities. Hence, the amount of information that leaks to Eve needs to be experimentally assessed in each wireless network.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally evaluate our adapted secret-agreement protocols (Section VI). Our goal is to answer two questions: is it feasible to achieve non-negligible secrecy rate in realistic wireless setups by leveraging packet erasures? And how well can we do so using our protocols?
A. Single-Hop Networks 1) Testbed: We show our testbed in Figure 1 . It consists of 6 nodes distributed over an indoor office area. Unless otherwise specified, the nodes are HTC Wildfire Android smartphones. We set the phones to 802.11 ad-hoc mode, and we fixed their transmission rate to 36 Mbps. In some experiments, we also use WARP software-defined radios [19] .
In order for our approach to work, the wireless network must provide a certain level of channel variability. The simplest scenario where such variability exists is when the nodes are not in direct line of sight, e.g., they are separated by office walls. This is the scenario we implement in our testbed. Our protocol can work even when the nodes are in direct line of sight, but for that we need to use artificial noise (the terminals create interference and force Eve to miss some of the traffic they exchange). We have experimented with that idea [14] , but we do not consider this approach in this paper.
When we refer to an "experiment," we mean that we place one node in each room, and we run one round of our protocol. In each experiment, one node plays the role of Eve, while the rest play the role of 5 terminals that exchange pairwise secrets. There are 6 possible arrangements of 5 terminals and Eve in 6 rooms, and we experiment with 3 different levels of transmit power. Hence, each presented graph summarizes the results of 3 × 6 experiments (all the combinations of transmit-power levels and node arrangements). For each transmit power level, we use a box plot as a convenient way of graphically depicting different groups of our measurements through their percentiles (we used matlab's boxplot function [20] ): On each box, the central horizontal line is the median, i.e., half of the measurements are below that level and the other half is above. The lower edge of the box is the 25th percentile (splits off the lowest 25% of measurements from the highest 75%) and the upper edge is the 75th percentile (splits off the lowest 75% of measurements from the highest 25%). The whiskers extend to the most extreme measurements not considered outliers, 6 and outliers are plotted individually and marked as +.
2) Ideal Secrecy Rate: We start with the ideal efficiency and secrecy rate achievable in this testbed by leveraging packet erasures. In particular, we measure the efficiency and secrecy rate of an oracle-assisted protocol; this works like ours, with the only difference that it does not estimate how much information Eve obtains in the initial phase -that knowledge is directly provided by the oracle. More specifically, instead of estimating V E using Equation 3, we set it to the exact number of x-packets shared by terminals T i /T j and missed by Eve. This oracle-assisted protocol by construction achieves reliability 1, because it knows exactly how much information Eve obtains in the initial phase and computes the longest secret that is completely unknown to Eve. In Figure 2 ("Ideal" label) we plot the efficiency/secrecy rate achieved by any terminal pair in any experiment, using the oracle-assisted protocol, as a function of the transmit power of the terminals.
First, we see that, if we perfectly knew Eve's channel conditions, all terminal pairs could create tens of thousands of secret bits per second, of which Eve would have zero information independently from her computational capabilities. This shows that a real wireless network may offer enough channel variability to enable secret generation in non-negligible rates. Second, we observe a variability regarding the secrecy rates achieved by different pairs of terminals, which reduces as the transmit power increases. This is because for low transmit powers the difference in physical distance between terminal pairs has a greater impact on the terminals' channel qualities than for high powers; as the transmit power increases the channel noise affects in a similar way the terminals' channel qualities, despite their differences in physical distance.
Third, we see that the secrecy rate drops as the transmit power of the terminals increases. This is due to the following reason: As the transmit power of a terminal increases, so does the quality of its channels to both the other terminals and Eve. Hence, higher transmit power means that the terminals receive correctly more packets, but also that Eve overhears more of their packets, decreasing, thus, their secrecy rate.
3) Reliability and Secrecy Rate of Our Protocol: Next, we look at the performance of our protocol. Unlike the oracle-assisted protocol, ours needs to estimate how much information Eve obtains in the initial phase. If it overestimates Eve's knowledge, it creates a shorter secret than it could, achieving lower efficiency/secrecy rate than the oracle-assisted protocol. If it underestimates Eve's knowledge, it creates a longer secret than it should, achieving higher secrecy rate than the oracle-assisted protocol, but reliability below 1. Hence, there is a trade-off between secrecy rate (how fast we create new secrets) and reliability (how secure these secrets are).
Ideally, we would want our protocol to behave like the oracle-assisted one (achieve the same secrecy rate and reliability 1). In practice, this is infeasible, as it would require us to always estimate Eve's knowledge with perfect accuracy. Thankfully, it is also unnecessary: Suppose a secret has reliability 0.6, which means that Eve can correctly guess the value of one bit of the secret with probability 2 −0.6 = 0.66. The smallest secret that our protocol ever creates is one y-packet (1 KB); reliability 0.6 means that Eve can correctly guess the value of one y-packet with probability 2 −0.6·8000 ≈ 0. Hence, as long as the terminals use their pairwise secrets at the granularity of a y-packet (e.g., they use at least one entire y-packet as an encryption key), they are secure from Eve. Figure 2 ("Effective" label) and Figure 3 show the efficiency/secrecy rate and the reliability of our protocol, as a function of the transmit power of the terminals. We see that, using our estimations, we can closely follow the behavior of Eve. Although we tend to slightly underestimate Eve's knowledge as the transmit power increases, on average the secrets we create have reliability above 0.8. This shows that, in a real wireless network, it may be feasible to accurately estimate an adversary's knowledge, if we have a sufficiently dense deployment of collaborating honest nodes. Of course, this estimation will become harder as we consider adversaries with increasingly more sophisticated hardware (e.g., multiple receiving antennas).
Finally, we note that we could increase further the reliability of our secrets by decreasing M i j , the number of y-packets that a terminal pair T i /T j can construct, by a constant factor φ. This would, of course decrease the efficiency/rate achieved by the terminals by the same factor. For example, we used φ = 2 in our experiments, which translated to half the rate reported in Figure 2 , but also to a reliability almost (with very few outliers close to 0.7) at 1 for all the produced secrets S i j .
4) Understanding Erasures:
In the above experiments, Eve uses a commodity device, i.e., a smartphone, to eavesdrop the communication medium; she, therefore, gains knowledge only from the information that is successfully delivered to her application layer. There exist packets that reach Eve's receiver, yet are not delivered to her application because they are corrupted beyond what the lower layers can repair. One could argue that, if Eve rooted her phone and gained access to every packet that reaches her physical layer (even the partially corrupted ones), she would improve her knowledge.
To investigate how much Eve's knowledge could be improved, we used three WARP software-defined radios, 7 configured with an 802.11-compliant physical layer (16 QAM over OFDM), and we placed them in our testbed. We make one of them (Alice) send out traffic, while the other two (Bob and Eve) receive. The difference from our earlier experiments is that now Eve tries to use all the packets that reach her physical layer (every correctly received packet but also every packet with partially corrupted payload -that would be normally dropped below the application layer, if Eve was using a smartphone) to increase her knowledge. First, we consider the packets that are correctly received by Bob, and we measure Fig. 4 . Eve's conditional entropy (in bits per channel use) when she has access to the packets that reach her receiver. In our setup, one "channel use" means sending one 16 QAM symbol. "Correction" corresponds to the case where an oracle corrects all corrupted packets that reach Eve.
Eve's knowledge (conditional entropy) about these packets. 8 Then we repeat the experiment, assuming that an oracle magically repairs the corrupted payload of every packet that reaches Eve's receiver. In the former case, Eve's uncertainty on Bob's information originates from both corrupted and erased symbols -this is equivalent to Eve using a smartphone, whereas in the latter only from erased ones (that do not reach Eve's receiver at all) -this is equivalent to Eve using a specialized radio receiver and to gaining the maximum possible knowledge out of partially corrupted packets. Figure 4 shows that -at least in our testbed -Eve's uncertainty mostly depends on the erased in-the-air symbols, i.e., symbols that were not demodulated at all. We observe that, if Alice uses transmit powers of 10, 15 and 20 dbm, in the second experiment (where all payload corruption is corrected by the oracle), Eve learns only an extra 0.2, 0.15 and 0.08 bitper-channel-use, respectively, relative to the first experiment. This indicates that the number of partially corrupted packets that reach Eve's receiver is relatively small, hence they do not significantly increase Eve's knowledge (or reduce the secrecy rate achieved by our protocol).
B. Multi-Hop Networks 1) Simulation Environment:
We use the Java-based, discrete event-driven simulator JiST [21] , along with the SWANS library [22] , that builds on top of JiST and provides all the elements needed to simulate ad-hoc wireless networks. We also used the extensions and bug-fixes proposed in [23] . In Table IV we summarize the configuration parameters of the simulation setup. We use an IEEE 802.11b/g compliant MAC configuration and an SNR frame reception model with an SNR threshold value appropriate for high data rates [24] . The RTS/CTS functionality is by default disabled.
The signal interference model used in the JiST/SWANS simulator is equivalent to the physical model of successful receptions as defined by Gupta and Kumar in [25] . This feature enables to simulate the hidden-terminal effect and exploit collisions and frame erasures for secrecy.
We simulate a wireless ad-hoc network as a set of n nodes uniformly at random placed on a square area of dimension . We consider networks with fixed network density per unit area, that is, for a k-hop area and a given density d we have in total n = k 2 * d nodes.
In our protocol, we set ttl = k, the maximum distance in the network, and the packet payload to 1KB, so that the resulting MAC frame (including the necessary headers of our protocol and of other layers) does not get fragmented. We also position Eve in each configuration to be in the network center, where we verified that she would have the highest probability to overhear the largest amount of packets. We also verified that the simulator produces very similar results, in the case of a single-hop network, to these produced in our testbed.
2) Ideal Secrecy Rate: As in the case of single-hop, we measure the efficiency/secrecy generation rate achieved by the oracle-assisted protocol. Figures 5, 6, 7 (label "Ideal") show the efficiency/rate achieved by the oracle alternative, over k-hop networks, with k = 1 . . . 5, and for network densities d = 10, 15, 20, respectively.
First, we observed that in all cases we simulated, we could generate non-zero rates across (almost) all pairs in the network. Notably, we observed that in all our simulations, only 56 pairs of nodes in total experienced zero rate (in particular configurations of 500 nodes, where in each configuration there exist 124750 possible pairs). Second, for every density, we observe that, as the size of the network increases, namely for k ≥ 3, the rate significantly drops. This is the aggregated result of two conflicting effects: (1) to create shared randomness over a k-hop network, each packet needs to be transmitted at least k times, which correspondingly reduces the rate; moreover the amount of common packets that a pair of terminals collects during the packet dissemination phase is smaller, because a smaller percentage of the generated packets reaches both, which in turn reduces the rate; (2) due to the existence of interference and multiple paths between two terminals in larger networks, Eve observes a smaller fraction of the common random packets that both terminals collect, which boosts the rate. We verified these effects in our simulations; we show here in Fig. 8 the second effect: we examine what percentage of packets shared between two nodes Eve has also observed (on average), and we find that this percentage decreases with the network size. Finally, for the 2-hop network, we observe that as the density increases, the rate also increases; this is because we have more nodes acting as sources, thus creating more interference and hindering Eve from collecting the same packets as her close neighbors. The existence of multiple paths, boosts further the rate, as demonstrated by the rates for a 2-hop network when comparing to the rate for an 1-hop network, for high network densities: the more nodes we have the more probable is that two nodes are connected through more than one paths, out of which Eve does not observe at least one. 3) Reliability and Secrecy Rate of Our Protocol: Fig. 5, 6 , 7 (label "Effective") demonstrate the efficiency/rate achieved by our protocol, and Fig. 9 the corresponding achieved reliability. In contrast to the oracle-assisted protocol, in our protocol the terminals need to estimate how many packets Eve misses, using the technique in Section VI-B.
We observe that our protocol can closely follow the oracleassisted protocol's performance, i.e., our estimator yields rather accurate estimations on Eve's knowledge. In some cases, namely for small densities and small networks, i.e., k ≤ 2, we underestimate Eve's knowledge, which yields reliability values around 0.7. Despite this, we observe that as the network increases in density and size, the terminals compute very good estimations; this is of course due to the fact that the more terminals there exist, the more side information on packet receptions is available, the easier it becomes to accurately estimate a terminal's (Eve's) behavior.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Existing information theoretical results characterize the largest achievable secrecy rate under a variety of idealized channel models [1] , [2] , [4] , [5] . The most common setting considers pairwise secret key generation over a single channel with a single sender and one or more receivers. Some results are available for a network setting, most notably secure network coding for an error-free wired network [16] . The secrecy capacity of wireless erasure networks is investigated in [26] , but no complete characterization is provided. A rich literature exists in designing practical codes for achieving the theoretical secrecy bounds (see [27] and references therein), but the proposed schemes typically aim in providing weak information theoretic security and in single message delivery (e.g., [8] , [28] - [30] ). Coding for strong secrecy usually yields low achievable rates and builds on the fact that Eve has a degraded channel compared to the legitimate nodes [27] .
Several practical protocols were recently also proposed that build on the symmetry and the randomness extracted from the wireless channel to set up strong information theoretically secure pairwise keys [9] - [11] , [31] , [32] . These achieve modest secret-generation rates (in modified 802.11 or 802.15 environments) and require node proximity, hence, they do not naturally translate to multi-hop networks/multiple keys creation. iJam [33] utilizes artificial interference (specific to OFDM) to increase Eve's uncertainty and it achieves a secret-generation rate up to 18 Kbps (in a modified 802.11). We differ in the following ways: to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to consider multi-terminal pairwise secret-agreement, where broadcast is leveraged to efficiently create multiple shared secrets at the same time. The existing protocols focus on a single pair of nodes, hence they are not designed to leverage broadcast, and they would not scale well with the number of terminals (if applied to the multi-terminal scenario). Moreover, our protocols achieve a secret-generation rate of tens of Kbps, without requiring any custom physicallayer operations that are specific to OFDM (or any other transmission scheme). More importantly, as noted earlier, the extension for a multi-hop network requires new techniques and also brings new secrecy opportunities. To our best knowledge the current work is the first to develop protocols for secret key exchange in a multi-hop network that simultaneously exploits channel and network properties, and to report secrecy rates of Kbps, through experimentation in realistic wireless setups.
IX. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We have presented two protocols for enabling a group of n wireless nodes to create pairwise secrets, in the presence of a passive adversary, with limited network presence, without assuming anything about her computational and memory capabilities. Our basic secret-agreement protocol operates in single-hop networks, it is information-theoretically secure and leverages broadcast to create secrets simultaneously between all terminal pairs. Our protocol for arbitrary, multi-hop networks, builds on the basic protocol and includes new designs, e.g., a custom packet dissemination protocol, to leverage the benefits of multi-hop for secrecy generation.
A main assumption we do is that Eve is a passive adversary. In the case that Eve is an active adversary (tries to impersonate a terminal), the terminals need to share some bootstrap information to authenticate each other when they first communicate. The need for this bootstrap information is fundamentally unavoidable: without it, there is no way for Alice to know she is talking to Bob until they have established their first secret. Authentication is orthogonal to our secret agreement and can happen in different ways, e.g., by requiring the terminals to initially share bootstrap information and use it to construct authentication codes for the x-packets (and the feedback packets) they transmit the first time they run our protocols. After the terminals have established their first pairwise secrets using our protocols, they can use these to construct new authentication codes, which do not depend on the bootstrap information.
One might argue: if the terminals have to share bootstrap information anyway to defend against active adversaries, they might as well share pairwise secrets to begin with and not run our protocols at all. The advantage of our protocols is that they enable the terminals to keep generating new secrets, independent from the previous ones, and continuously refresh their encryption and authentication keys. Unless the adversary can break into one of the terminals while they run our protocols, she has a small window of opportunity to compromise their communication: she has to steal the bootstrap information and impersonate a terminal while the terminals are running our protocols for the first time.
On the practical side, we evaluated our protocols through testbed experimentation and extensive simulations, and we showed that, both on single-hop and multi-hop networks, it is feasible to generate secrets at non-negligible rates. Our results motivate us to investigate further the robustness of our protocols, under the presence of adversaries with increasing network presence (multiple antennas, collaborating Eves etc.).
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We consider our eavesdropper to be either Eve or one of the participating terminals. Our eavesdropper has two occasions to obtain information about the secret S i j : by overhearing a fraction of the transmitted x-packets in the initial phase; or because a terminal knows the source packets it transmitted. Both these effects are captured in the calculation of the number M i j . Under the theoretical conditions of the erasure channel model, we can approximate these numbers with their average value; Lemma 6 shows that this approximation can become arbitrarily good exponentially fast in N. Given that we use any value M i j smaller or equal to the exact, the following Lemma 5 gives a construction that does not allow the eavesdropper to obtain any information about S i j . Proof: Let W be a matrix that has as rows the packets Eve has. To prove that the y-packets are information-theoretically secure from Eve, we must show that:
H (Y |W ) = H (Y ).
We can write
where A E is a N E × N matrix of rank(A E ) = N E , which specifies the N E distinct x-packets that are known to Eve. A E is not known to us, however we know is that in each row of A E there is only one 1 and the remaining elements are zero; so all of the vectors in the row span of A E have Hamming weight (the number of nonzero elements of a vector [15] ) less than or equal to N E . On the other hand, from construction, rank(A) = N − N E , and each vector in the row span of A has Hamming weight larger than or equal to N E + 1 [15] ; thus the row span of A and A E are disjoint (except for the zero vector) and the matrix B is full-rank, i.e. rank (B) = N. If the packets x i have length L, we have that: Proof: Consider the random variable U r E denoting the number of x-packets transmitted by T r and received by both T i /T j but not Eve. We use a standard argument to show it concentrates exponentially fast to its average. Define the random variable η 3 , where in the last inequality we use Chernoff bound [34, Ch. 4] . We can also write, for 0 < ≤ 1,
APPENDIX B CONCENTRATION TO EXPECTED VALUES
. Similar arguments hold for the remaining variables in Section III-E.
